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DEVELOPING A THEORY OF GENDERED PREJUDICE

*An Evolutionary and Social Dominance Perspective**

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In this chapter, we argue that racism and ethnocentrism should be viewed as gendered phenomena. We provide a framework for interpreting current findings in the social psychological literature on prejudice, and for framing predictions about its gendered nature.

Our evolutionary approach to the gendered nature of prejudice is informed by social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which holds that all human societies are composed of group-based social hierarchies that are stratified on the basis of the following: (a) age: adults have greater social power than the young; (b) gender: men have greater social power than women; and (c) arbitrary sets, which are socially constructed groupings of individuals on the basis of salient characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, social class, and religion—some of which have greater social power than others. In this view, arbitrary-set distinctions can indeed be, literally, quite arbitrary; yet, it is the capacity of the human mind to mentally process arbitrary set groups as “real” entities with their own goals and interests that undergird the potential for racial and ethnic prejudice.

* This chapter is dedicated to Marilyn B. Brewer, a magnificent scholar who, among many other things, has substantially affected the development of SDT in ways she is scarcely aware of.

As a kind of "realistic group conflict" theory, at a broad level, SDT argues that prejudice is at least partly motivated by the desire among individuals of one arbitrary-set group to acquire more resources, status, and power for one's own group at the expense of other groups. However, it goes further than other group conflict perspectives in the claim that because "male" and "female" are fundamental categories across the natural world, arbitrary-set group prejudice is largely determined by the gender of both the target and agent of prejudice. More specifically, with the understanding of race and ethnic categories as types of arbitrary-set groups, it generates the counterintuitive prediction that minority men, not minority women, should be expected to be the primary targets of racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination. This prediction stands in contrast to rather intuitive expectations derived from standard feminist and social identity theory, according to which minority women are thought to be subjected to a kind of "double jeopardy" because they share membership in two disadvantaged categories and should therefore be doubly disadvantaged as the targets of both gender and racial discrimination (Almquist, 1975; Beale, 1970).

SDT arrives at this provocative hypothesis along the following theoretical lines. As a psychological manifestation of the conflict of interests among groups, prejudice is, to a large extent, motivated by the goal of *social dominance*, defined as the desire for hierarchically structured and dominant/subordinate relationships among salient social groups. However, because men are predisposed to aggressive status striving with other men, this goal is primarily a characteristic of the psychology of men. As such, SDT argues that men are expected to be the primary agents of arbitrary-set discrimination. Additionally, because intrasexual competition is expected to be greater among men than among women, men are also more likely to be the primary *targets* of arbitrary-set discrimination. From this line of reasoning, the authors have put forth a so-called subordinate male target hypothesis (SMTH; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which simply states that it is men, not women, who will serve as both the primary targets and agents of prejudice and discrimination against racial minorities (Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000).

Although a considerable amount of empirical evidence can be marshaled in support of the SMTH, we submit that an extension and a few important theoretical clarifications are in order. We first revisit the logic underlying the SMTH and clarify its conceptual footing within modern evolutionary theory—specifically with regard to the theories of parental investment and sexual selection (Bateman, 1948; Darwin, 1871; Trivers, 1972). In doing so, we reiterate the empirical claim that men should serve as both the primary agents and targets of arbitrary-set-based prejudice,

but make a few important qualifications to the nature of such prejudice. Contrary to the assumptions of many theorists and researchers within the field of intergroup relations (e.g., Alexander, 1979; Kurzman & Leary, 2001; Sumner, 1906), Brewer (1979) made the early and critical observation that in-group favoritism is distinct from out-group denigration or aggression. Brewer (2007) has reiterated: "Despite widespread belief that in-group positivity and out-group derogation are reciprocally related, empirical research demonstrates little consistent relationship between the two. Indeed, results from both laboratory experiments and field studies indicate that variations in in-group positivity and social identification do not systematically correlate with the degree of bias or negativity toward out-groups" (p. 730).

This distinction between intergroup prejudice as in-group favoritism versus out-group aggression is critical to our understanding of the intersection between gender and prejudice. Based on the assumptions of SDT, we see little theoretical reason to expect prejudice, defined as in-group favoritism, to be gendered, in that there should be few, if any, gender differences in the levels of in-group favoritism among men and women, nor with respect to the gender of the targets of in-group favoritism. In contrast, this gender orthogonality is not expected when intergroup prejudice is defined in terms of out-group aggression, dominance, or social predation. Within this domain of intergroup prejudice, men are expected to be both the primary agents and targets of intergroup predation and aggression. Furthermore, we make the qualification that power asymmetries need not exist between groups in order for negativity toward the males of other groups to be expressed, that is, the targeted group need not necessarily be subordinate, as the SMTH implies.

Finally, we provide a theoretical clarification for the claim that men, not women, will serve as the primary targets of intergroup prejudice and give an evolutionary account of how women may also be expected to be prejudiced toward out-group men. In doing so, we temper the claim that prejudice is largely a "male affair," and develop the notion that on evolutionary grounds, men and women both have cause to act as agents of prejudice toward out-group men, with the qualification that the underlying motivations for this prejudice are gender specific. We posit that whereas prejudice held by men may be driven by aggression against and dominance over men belonging to arbitrary-set groups other than one's own (out-groups), women's prejudice is more likely to be characterized by wariness or fearfulness of such men. These predictions are derived from the theories of parental investment and sexual selection, coupled with a narrative account of human evolutionary

history in which women were not the primary agents of intergroup aggression but were commonly its victims—particularly with respect to sexual assault. Although it may be the case that men exhibit greater levels of intergroup prejudice than women in most domains, women are certainly not immune from prejudiced motivations, attitudes, emotions, and behavior. We provide both the theoretical framework and empirical evidence for our claims in the following sections.

PARENTAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND SEXUAL SELECTION

From an evolutionary perspective, one could argue that many of the robust psychological differences between men and women can be explained in terms of the differential reproductive opportunities and risks by which male and female mammals are constrained. Because of the way mammalian reproductive systems are designed, females are obligated to invest much more heavily in offspring than are males—even before socialization of offspring occurs—in terms of time, energy, and resources associated with fertilization, gestation, parturition, and lactation.

In sharp contrast, males have no physiological obligations in offspring past successful fertilization. This stark asymmetry in obligate physiological investment between the sexes sets the stage for complementary asymmetries in behavioral strategies to cope with these realities. As the higher investor in the mating transactions necessary to produce offspring, females are more discriminating in their choice of a candidate from the lower investing sex. Females also do not experience reproductive benefits from engaging in extra matings between conception and weaning. This leads to a female mating strategy that can be described as one primarily concerned with selecting mates of high *quality* (as mating strategies that maximize quantity are of little benefit to females), so as to not waste their costly investment.

On the other hand, because males are not burdened with the same obligate costs in producing offspring, they are the less choosy sex. In contrast to the low reproductive benefits available to females pursuing multiple matings, males benefit more from a *quantity* mating strategy as their reproductive success rises as a function of the number of fertile mates with whom they copulate. These conflicting prerogatives of males and females create an incentive structure that rewards the lower investing sex for engaging in risky, aggressive, and often dangerous strategies for eliminating or neutralizing same-sex competitors in order to increase one's mating access to the higher investing sex.

Such strategies are thought to result from the evolutionary process of *sexual selection*—a form of natural selection that leads to the evolution of traits or strategies that have little to do with survival but more to do with increasing one's ability to attract or gain access to mates. Sexual selection can operate on traits or strategies that make one more successful in competition with others of the same sex (intrasexual selection), such as contesting for territory, food, status, mates, and other resources, or it can operate between the sexes (intersexual selection) where the preferences of one sex produces characteristics in the other sex that satiate that preference (e.g., nuptial gifts, peacock tails). With respect to violent conflict, intrasexual and intersexual selection may operate via a feedback loop to produce more violent, aggressive, and risky behaviors among males than among females. Males with attributes that provide them with an advantage in intrasexual competition may be more likely to be preferred as mates by females, who then pass the genes for those male attributes and their own preferences for them on to future generations. It is this process of sexual selection that results in the dimorphic phenotypes observed in many species, such that males tend to be larger, more heavily muscled, better armed (e.g., larger teeth and horns), and more prone to lethal aggression (Daly & Wilson, 1988).

When the insights from sexual selection theory are coupled with the logic of parental investment theory, several implications emerge that can be applied to the domain of intergroup conflict. Such implications are relevant to understanding the fundamental nature of intergroup prejudice and how gender plays a key role in its expression. As is the case with the gender asymmetry in reproductive benefits gained from engaging in violent, intrasexual conflict at the individual level, it has been argued that aggression at the group level could also yield the potential for immense gains in reproductive resources for males relative to females (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988). Consider the example given by Tooby and Cosmides (1988) of a coalition of males who eliminate the males of a neighboring group and usurp their females. The males in the victorious group would experience a staggeringly steep increase in their fitness. Of course, males of other groups do not sit idly by while they are eliminated and are likely to violently resist, thereby exacting a substantial cost on the aggressors. However, even if the risk of failure among the aggressors is high and there are few survivors among male combatants, such risks are readily offset by the exponentially increasing benefits bestowed upon the victors because the reproductive rewards would be split among a smaller number of beneficiaries.

Our analysis suggests that the incentive structure of intergroup conflict is such that selection would have been particularly strong in shaping male-specific psychological traits that motivate aggression toward, and dominance over, other social groups. These psychological traits may take the form of emotions, attitudes, and cognitive biases whose ultimate function is to disadvantage or debilitate other groups relative to one's own, particularly when the out-group targets are male. However, the psychology of prejudice among females is not likely to reflect the same function as it does for men as the incentives for intergroup aggression among females are less rewarding in an evolutionary sense. Not unlike males, females have much to lose from aggressive intergroup conflict, but there is little to gain because of their lower ceiling on reproductive success that can be had by increasing the pool of available mates. As such, it is unlikely that selection would have favored a female-specific psychology for intergroup aggression and dominance.

Using parental investment and sexual selection theory, the preceding arguments provide a theoretical basis for the expectation that males should be the primary agents of violent intergroup conflict and that this agency is motivated by a desire to dominate out-groups in the service of obtaining valuable reproductive resources. However, a few issues remain to be clarified. First, it is necessary to address whether the out-group target must necessarily be "subordinate" as was originally specified by the SMTH. Using the logic of sexual selection theory, we can derive no principles as to why intergroup aggression should necessarily be restricted toward males of subordinate groups. Males of any group, regardless of the group's dominant or subordinate status, should be motivated to dominate other groups, or at the very least should aggressively resist being dominated, as the potential for complete failure in reproductive fitness is so great. Despite this, dominant groups may be more likely to target subordinate out-groups when power asymmetries are large because it is less costly to do so, given the strategic advantage that power imbalances bestow on dominant groups (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988).

A second issue yet to be clarified within the context of intergroup conflict is why males, as the primary agents of intergroup aggression, do not target out-group females as well as out-group males. The logic of sexual selection suggests that males do not view females as competitors, but rather as contested resources. This is true for both in-group and out-group females, as it is often the case that females from the out-group are incorporated into the victorious group after intergroup conflict (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Males are more likely to attempt to control female's ability to acquire

resources, thereby forcing economic dependence, than to treat them as competitors. In the same vein, male's ability to monopolize the available resources increases their value and attractiveness as a mate. This suggests that it is not generally the purview of males to harm or debilitate females as they are an invaluable resource as mates and caretakers of offspring. In contrast, it is the intent of males to harm and debilitate other males, as they represent an obstacle that impedes their ability to acquire mating opportunities. As such, gender bias functions as a paternalistic brand of discrimination rooted in a sense of male proprietorship over females, rather than their elimination or debilitation as competitors. This is not intended to suggest that women are not discriminated against on the basis of their membership in a particular arbitrary-set, but rather that this discrimination is more likely to be indirect, occurring as a result of their association with out-group men as daughters, sisters, mothers, and so forth (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

A third and final clarification of the original SMTH concerns the role of females as agents of prejudice. We have argued thus far that males are expected to be both the primary agents and targets of intergroup violence. However, it is certainly not the case that females are free from prejudiced motivations. As alluded to in the previous paragraph, among humans and chimpanzees, sexual and physical abuse of females is not an uncommon occurrence during intergroup conflict. Although females are typically spared from the most lethal forms of violence as combatants or victims, they may suffer threats to their reproductive choice through coercive and violent sexual attacks (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). The violent conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur over the last two decades are relatively recent instances that highlight the brutality females experience during such conflicts. It is, therefore, a conflict of interest among males and females that characterizes gender relations in intergroup contexts. As a function of females' high investment in offspring, reproductive choice is of crucial importance to females. In light of this, selection may have favored females who were particularly vigilant in the protection of their reproductive choice. Because intergroup conflict seems to have been much more common in prehistoric societies than in historic societies (Bamforth, 1994; Ember, Daly, & Wilson, 1978; Keeley, 1996; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996), women most likely faced considerably greater threat of sexual assault from out-group than from in-group males, if one corrects for the amount of time spent in the proximity of both categories of males. To the extent that out-group males pose a greater threat to female choice than in-group males, everything else being equal, a number of psychological mechanisms may have been

selected for that generate prejudice toward out-group males. The expression of this bias, however, is not likely to take the form of aggression and domination. The sexual dimorphic differences in size and strength between males and females would make this a very costly enterprise. Rather, the mechanism should promote avoidance of out-group members through fearful emotions along with attitudes and beliefs that characterize out-groups as threatening.

It is, therefore, not the case that men should be the only agents of intergroup prejudice nor is it predicted that men will *always* exhibit more prejudice than women. Instead, we posit that both men and women are agents of prejudice, but that the character of this prejudice and its underlying motivations differ among men and women as a function of the different adaptive challenges each has faced over evolutionary time in the context of intergroup violence. Women are more motivated by threats to their reproductive choice, whereas men are more motivated to out-compete sexual rivals. In accordance with these motives, women's out-group prejudice will be expressed via an avoidance strategy characterized by fear, whereas men's prejudice will be expressed via an approach-oriented strategies characterized by aggression, violence, dominance, and social predation. The precise level of prejudice exhibited by men and women should, therefore, be dependent on characteristics of the situation and types of prejudice motivation that are subsequently aroused.

Guided by the theories of sexual selection and parental investment, we have clarified and extended a number of predictions put forth by the SMTH as originally proposed by SDT (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the process, we have altered the nature of the original hypothesis such that it may no longer be adequately characterized by the name, "subordinate male target hypothesis." In its stead, we propose a theory of gendered prejudice, which asserts three primary predictions: (1) out-group men serve as the primary targets of intergroup prejudice, especially when this prejudice is expressed as out-group denigration and aggression; (2) although both men and women may serve as agents of intergroup prejudice, as expressed by in-group bias and in-group favoritism, men will tend to be the primary agents of prejudice, as expressed by out-group denigration, intergroup domination, and social predation; and (3) men and women's out-group prejudice is driven by different underlying motivations—out-group prejudice among women is significantly motivated by fearful avoidance, whereas out-group prejudice among men is more likely to be motivated by a combination of aggression and social dominance. We will now turn to empirical work that supports these predictions.

EMPIRICAL SUPPORT

Intrasexual Competition and Risky Behavior

Arguing from the logic of parental investment theory and sexual selection, we have asserted that men have greater incentive to engage in high-risk behaviors in order to compete for access to women who represent a both highly valued and scarce resource. As such, we should find evidence that intrasexual competition is greater among men than women and that men engage in riskier, competitive tactics than women. We find evidence of this in the literature examining both human and primate intergroup aggression. For example, among chimpanzees, it is primarily the males, not females, that form alliances (generally along kinship lines) and then engage in intergroup hostility (Goodall, 1986).

Evidence of substantially higher levels of intrasexual competition and aggression among men can be found all around us, from self-report measures of aggression to aggressive behavior in laboratory studies, intensely competitive forms of play among male children, individual homicides, gang wars, and full-scale international conflagrations (e.g., Archer, 2004; Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1986; Keegan, 1993; Terrell, Hill, & Nagoshi, 2008; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Although there is certainly intense and sometimes violent intrasexual competition among human women often expressed in the form of reputational aggression (see especially Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003; see also Archer, 2004; Borkqvist, Lagerpetz, & Kaukainen, 1992; Campbell, 1999), competition among men is often much more physically violent and lethal than that found among women.

Evidence of the substantially higher levels of physical competitiveness and aggression among men can also be seen in homicide data. For example, in the United States during the interval between 1976 and 2004, men committed 93.3% of felony murders (see Bureau of Justice Statistics). Furthermore, as reported by Daly and Wilson (1988), when one restricts attention to intrasexual homicide (i.e., same-sex homicide) across a broad array of societies,* roughly 96% of such mayhem is male violence targeted against other males.

The disproportionate rate of intrasexual male violence is not just restricted to individual acts of violence but can also be found in various forms of collective conflict such as intertribal, interclan, intergang, and interstate warfare. The fact that intergroup warfare tends to be

* The societies included in this statistic are Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England, Germany, Iceland, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, the United States, Scotland, Uganda, Wales, and Zaire.

dominated by men has been observed for some time. For example, the well-known war historian Keegan (1993) remarks that "warfare is, nevertheless, the one human activity from which women, with the most insignificant exceptions, have always and everywhere stood apart.... Women, however, do not fight. They rarely fight among themselves and they never, in any military sense, fight men. If warfare is as old as history and as universal as mankind, we must now enter the supremely important limitation that it is an entirely masculine activity" (p. 76).

When risky and competitive behavior is examined in the laboratory, the same gender differences arise again and again. For example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) examined whether men and women of the same abilities differed in their preference to participate in a competitive task. Participants completed a simple math task with a noncompetitive incentive structure and then completed the same task with a tournament style, competitive incentive structure. For a third task, participants were permitted to choose an incentive structure for the task. Of the male participants, 73% selected the competitive task, whereas only 35% of the female participants made this choice. The authors found that this gender difference was not explained by differences in performance but instead was partially driven by men's greater preference for performing competitively. Along similar lines, Kleimans (2009) reported that women evince a greater distaste for competition than men and that this distaste predicts women's selection into less competitive occupations.

This research demonstrates rather conclusively that men tend to not only exhibit more competitive and risky behavior than do women, but actually seek out opportunities to engage competitively with others. Unfortunately, this research does not address intrasexual competition within an intergroup context and also does little to demonstrate the underlying motivations for this behavior. To address the first issue regarding intergroup context, Van Vugt, De Cremer, and Janssen (2007) demonstrated, across three studies, that in public goods tasks, men contributed more to their in-group when they believed they were competing against an out-group, whereas women tended to contribute equally regardless of whether or not they thought they were competing against an out-group. These results suggest that cues of intergroup competition are particularly salient to men relative to women. To address the issue regarding the underlying motivations of intrasexual competition, a recent study has provided support for the notion that risky and competitive behavior among men is in the service of securing mating opportunities. Baker and Maner (2009) had participants complete a behavioral measure of riskiness under a variety of conditions associated with mating opportunities. Participants first viewed a

video of an opposite-sex partner (confederate) who disclosed that they were either single or engaged to be married. Participants then completed the risk task either privately or under the assumption that their performance would be viewed by their partner. The results indicated that men, but not women, exhibited riskier behavior when they believed that a single opposite-sex partner would view their performance. These results suggest men's risky and competitive behavior is at least partly driven by the desire to impress the opposite sex when a mating opportunity is potentially available.

The research described above suggests that intrasexual competition is greater among men relative to women. This greater competition comes in the form of real-world aggressive and often lethal violence, and also in more controlled laboratory studies demonstrating a greater propensity for competitive and risky behavior among men relative to women. Finally, there is evidence that the risky and competitive behavior of men is in the service of promoting the acquisition of mating opportunities. Such evidence is in accord with the arguments we derived from parental investment theory and sexual selection, namely that men have far more to gain, relative to women, by engaging in competitive and risky status-striving strategies. It has been further argued that these same processes that drive greater intrasexual competition among men within a group can be extrapolated to account for the violent and aggressive intergroup conflict observed among men. That is, the potential benefits associated with intergroup competition are far greater for men than for women, thereby making it more likely that men will serve as the primary targets and agents of intergroup aggression. We now review evidence specific to intergroup relations, looking first at evidence that men are the primary targets of arbitrary-set discrimination, then turning to evidence that men are the primary agents of intergroup prejudice (although certainly not the sole agents), and finally examining the gender-specific psychologies that motivate intergroup prejudice among men and women.

Targets of Intergroup Prejudice

Evidence that out-group men rather than out-group women, constitute the primary targets for arbitrary-set animus and antagonism can be found across an array of everyday domains of life, including the labor market, criminal justice system, housing and retail markets, and educational sector. However, the clearest and least ambiguous evidence in support of this prediction can be observed in hate crime statistics. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, there were some 210,000 hate crimes committed in the United States between July 2000 and

December 2003 in which the violent victimization rate was 50% higher for men than for women* (see Harlow, 2005).

One can also find evidence that men are the primary targets of intergroup prejudice in the more mundane instances of everyday discrimination. Perhaps the clearest of such evidence is found in the labor market. For example, in a study of minority disadvantage in Great Britain in 1974, Smith (1976) found that white women earned a weekly wage which that was approximately 3% higher than that earned by black women. However, this relative advantage of whites over blacks was substantially larger among men, in which it was found that white men earned a weekly wage that was 10% higher than that of black men. American census data tend to show the same gender-moderated racial differences in earnings. For example, in 1994, white women showed average yearly earnings that were approximately 7% higher than black women whereas white men had average yearly earnings that were 44% higher than that of black men (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

The same pattern of gender-moderated discrimination is found even after controlling for educational achievement. For example, Farley and Allen (1987) conducted an illuminating series of analyses on additional hourly wages earned as a function of one additional year of education among white and black men and women. Although all gender-by-ethnicity groups benefited economically by increased educational investment, these economic returns on educational investment were not equally distributed. White men received a higher return rate on one additional year of college education than did black men in both 1960 (\$0.78 vs. \$0.58 per hour, respectively) and 1980 (\$0.96 vs. \$0.63 per hour). However, the pattern was very different for white and black women, where the *exact opposite* trend held. In 1960, white women received an additional \$0.59 per hour, while black women received an additional \$0.62 per hour in wages. In 1980, the same pattern held, but with black women earning even more per hour than white women (\$0.79 vs. \$0.64). In other words, while the basic data can provide some basis for a claim of arbitrary-set (i.e., racial) discrimination against black men, there is no evidence in these data to support a case of arbitrary-set discrimination against black women.

The same type of gender-moderated income asymmetry was also found in Bowen and Bok's (1998) longitudinal study of the 1995 incomes of black and white students from the entering class of 1976 to America's elite universities and colleges. Their analyses showed that although white

women graduates earned slightly more than black women graduates (i.e., \$64,100 vs. \$60,900 per year respectively), this "racial" gap between white and black women essentially disappeared once a very comprehensive set of controls* were introduced (\$64,000 vs. \$63,700 per year respectively). However, the racial differences between men were not so easily accounted for by controls. Mean earned income in 1995 for white men was 29.1% higher than that of black men. Although these differences were attenuated after comprehensive controls were introduced, there was still a 9% earnings advantage in favor of white men.

This gender-moderated racial victimization can also be found by use of controlled field employment audits.[†] For example, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) performed a small meta-analysis of some 19 employment audits, contrasting the employment outcomes for varying dominant and subordinate groups across five nations (i.e., Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States). While all of these studies showed significant levels of employment discrimination against members of subordinate ethnic groups, controlling for a number of factors, the results showed that the discrimination against subordinate men was substantially higher than that against subordinate women (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, pp. 162–172). These effects persist into the 21st century and with respect to other minority groups as well. For example, according to the U.S. Census, the 2006 earnings of white women from full-time employment were approximately 16% greater than that of black women and 42% greater than that of Latino women. In contrast, white men earned 37% more than black men and 73% more than Latino men (U.S. Census, Current Population Survey, 2007; see Figure 10.1).

Within the retail sector, Ayres and colleagues have conducted a number of field experiments exploring the degree to which arbitrary sets are discriminated against within the automobile market (Ayres, 1991, 1995; Ayres & Siegelman, 1995). In a series of audit studies, teams of black and white men and women auditors were sent to a number of randomly selected car dealerships to negotiate for new cars. Holding all other economically relevant factors constant (e.g., income, credit worthiness, employment history), it was shown that although black women were required to pay somewhat more than equivalently qualified white

* These analyses controlled for SAT scores, GPA, fields of study, SES, selectivity of schools attended, advanced degrees attained, and sector of employment.

† Audit studies measure discrimination directly with experimental fieldwork. Audit studies can unambiguously demonstrate discrimination by presenting the subjects with two nearly identical candidates, who differ in only one characteristic, such as race, age, or gender. Thus, any systematic and differential treatment of the auditors by the subjects of the study can be directly attributed to discrimination.

* Annual rate of violent victimizations was 0.9 per 1,000 persons for men and 0.6 per 1,000 persons for women.




Figure 10.1 2006 median income by race and sex.

women (i.e., \$260 more at initial offer, \$231 more at final offer), black men were required to pay considerably more than white men for the same car, everything else being equal (i.e., \$960 at initial offer, \$1,133.6 at final offer; see Ayres, 1995).

Perhaps, the clearest way to appreciate gender-moderated racial differences in discrimination can be found in criminal justice outcomes. Figure 10.2 gives ratios of imprisonment in state and federal prisons for blacks and whites, and Latinos and whites as a function of gender for the year 2006. In sum, black men were imprisoned at a rate six times greater than that of white men. In contrast, the racial disparity among black and white women was less extreme, with black women being imprisoned at a rate three times greater than that of white women. This same basic pattern also held with respect to whites and Latinos. In addition, Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) have shown that racial discrimination in bail amounts is only found with respect to black and Latino men, and not with respect to black or Latino women. Similar patterns of gendered racial discrimination have been substantiated within the criminal justice system of the United Kingdom (Hood & Cordovil, 1992).

Recently, research has demonstrated the utility of using a classical conditioning paradigm to investigate psychological biases toward threatening or feared stimuli, including racial out-groups. For example, Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps (2005) demonstrated that




Figure 10.2 Ratio of black/white and Latino/white incarceration in American state and federal prisons as a function of sex in the year 2006.

conditioned fear toward facial displays of individuals belonging to a racial group other than one's own resists extinction, whereas fear toward faces of one's own racial group does not. Their results held for both white and black American research participants toward white and black out-group targets. In an extension of this work, Navarrete et al. (2009) demonstrated that the extinction bias directed toward out-group faces is specific to the faces of men only, that is, there are no differences in the extinction of conditioned fear between the faces of in-group women, out-group women, or in-group men; it is only out-group men faces that engender a resistance to extinction. Most importantly, these results demonstrate that, using a unique measurement of racial bias that precludes conscious control, psychological biases are primarily directed toward out-group men, not women. In addition, although much of the research investigating the targets of intergroup prejudice has focused only on subordinate groups as targets, these results find that both black and white participants exhibit a bias in response to men of their respective out-groups. This result lends support to our claim that the target of prejudice need not necessarily be a member of a subordinate group, but that this may often be the case given the asymmetries in power that often exist between subordinate and dominant groups.

In sum, the research detailed in this section has provided an abundance of evidence suggesting that when arbitrary-set out-group discrimination occurs, it is primarily men who serve as the targets of this discrimination. We now turn to research examining the agent side of intergroup prejudice. We intend to demonstrate that it is primarily men who fill this role but qualify this statement with the expectation that women will also exhibit prejudice toward out-group men, but that this prejudice reflects a distinct underlying motivation that differs from the primary motives of men.

Agents of Intergroup Prejudice

Keeping the distinction between out-group negativity and in-group favoritism in mind (see Brewer, 1979, 2007), our argument is not that in-group bias or in-group favoritism is gendered, but rather that it is out-group hostility and aggression that will tend to be gendered (see also Brown & Smith, 1989; Khan & Lambert, 1998; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). That is, in addition to the evolutionary reasoning reviewed above, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest that men display greater out-group hostility, xenophobia, derogation, and aggression than do women.

Using survey methodology, Sidanius and Ekehammar (Ekehammar & Sidanius, 1982; Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1980) were among the first to systematically explore gender differences with respect to xenophobia and classical racism. In two relatively large and independent samples of Swedish high school students, not only did men tend to be more politically conservative in general* but they appeared to be particularly more xenophobic than their female counterparts. Shortly after the appearance of these first Swedish studies, other scholars began to replicate these gender differences using samples of British, South African, and Swedish respondents (see Ekehammar, 1985; Furnham, 1985; Marjoribanks, 1981).

Although these early results are quite suggestive, they often did not compare men and women using exactly the same set of racism items across different samples, nor did they use racism items specifically selected with a clear negative tone of out-group hostility and superiority/inferiority. Therefore, we compared the largest Swedish data set originally collected by Sidanius and Ekehammar in 1979 with a moderately sized sample of high school students from Melbourne, Australia, collected in 1985.† To measure the construct of “classical racism” in as dominance oriented a fashion as the data would permit, we defined

racism by the degree of endorsement of a single item, “white superiority.” The results showed the expected gender difference, with men exhibiting significantly higher levels of support for white superiority than women within both Sweden and Australia (Figure 10.3).

These same gender differences were replicated in the United States in a large sample of graduate and undergraduate students at the University of Texas at Austin in 1986 (Sidanius, Cling, & Pratto, 1991). In this study, classical racism was operationalized by the degree of support for the following five items: (1) “racial equality,” (2) “a black President of the USA,” (3) “each ethnic group should stay in its own place,” (4) “there are too many blacks on campus,” and (5) “white superiority.” Results indicated that, across six ethnic categories of participants, men exhibited more explicitly racist attitudes than women (see Figure 10.4). Similar findings were observed in a study conducted approximately 10 years later at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA; Sidanius, Levin, van Laar, & Sears, 2008). Once again, classical racism was measured by items implying intergroup dominance and superiority/inferiority. Specifically, classical racism was indexed by the degree to which students endorsed the two statements: (1) “blacks are inherently inferior” and (2) “Latinos are inherently inferior.” Across four different ethnic categories of participants, and consistent with the results found in




Figure 10.3 Support for white superiority as a function of gender and nationality (Sweden, $N = 772$, and Australia, $N = 274$, in 1979 and 1985).

* With the exception of religiosity, where women were found to be consistently more religious than men.

† See description of Australian data set in Sidanius and Peña (2003).




Figure 10.4 Classical racism as a function of gender and ethnicity among University of Texas students in 1986 ($N = 5,610$).

Sweden, Australia, and Texas, the California data showed significantly higher levels of classical racism among men than among women (see Figure 10.5). Importantly, there is evidence that these gender differences have persisted into post-Obama America and in a nonstudent sample. In a large sample of Harvard study pool participants and adult members of the Boston and Cambridge communities collected in 2009, men had significantly higher levels of racism than women, within both the student and nonstudent groups (see Figure 10.6).

Social dominance theorists have long argued that not only should one find greater explicit racism and xenophobia against specific ethnic groups (i.e., blacks, Latinos) among men relative to women, but that this greater out-group hostility among men should extend to arbitrary-set out-groups in general. This desire to establish and maintain dominant/subordinate relationships vis-à-vis a broad array of social groups is referred to as *social dominance orientation* (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the last 20 years, SDO has become one of the most widely studied constructs within the field of intergroup relations and has been shown to predict negative attitudes against a wide range of denigrated social groups such as Jews, blacks, Muslims, Arabs, gays, women, Latinos, Asians, foreigners,




Figure 10.5 Classical racism as a function of gender and ethnicity among UCLA students in 1996 ($N = 1,694$).




Figure 10.6 Classical racism as a function of gender and student status in 2009 ($N = 2,592$).

immigrants, refugees, poor people, and even minimal out-groups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mithic, 2008; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994; Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2008). In addition, SDO has also been found to strongly predict a wide variety of group-relevant social attitudes and legitimizing ideologies such as social conservatism, racism, sexism, belief in the protestant work ethic, just world beliefs, support for free market capitalism, patriotism, nationalism, support for wars of aggression, opposition to wars for humanitarian reasons, and a range of other group-relevant social beliefs and ideologies (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

In what has been labeled the *invariance hypothesis*, and for reasons outlined above, social dominance theorists have argued that, everything else being equal, men should display higher levels of SDO than women. The invariance hypothesis has been one of the most thoroughly examined and confirmed hypotheses within SDT. There is now very considerable and consistent evidence in support of this hypothesis found in scores of different studies, over dozens of different cultures, and using thousands of respondents (e.g., Levin, 2004; Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997; Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Brief, 1995; Sidanius, Sinclair, & Pratto, 2006). Most recently, Lee, Pratto, and Johnson (2009) conducted a meta-analysis using some 74 published and unpublished studies conducted between 1979 and 2004 on gender differences with respect to SDO. The data set contained 117 samples across 21 countries and employed 18,178 male and 20,524 female participants. Results revealed very robust gender differences that were particularly stable from sample to sample. Thus, these data clearly indicate that men not only have higher levels of prejudice against a particular out-group (i.e., blacks), but this higher level of out-group hostility among men seems to apply to out-groups in general.*

* There are two versions of the invariance hypothesis: the strong version and the weak version (see Sidanius et al., 1995). The strong version expects SDO differences between men and women to be impervious to moderation (e.g., culture, gender role norms), and the weak version allows for the possibility that the gender differences in SDO might be moderated by factors in the social context (e.g., level of intergroup threat, ethnic homogeneity, power equality between men and women). However, the weak version would expect that this possible interaction between gender and contextual potential moderators will be ordinal rather than disordinal in nature. This is to say that while the degree to which men have higher SDO levels than women might vary across different contexts, this interaction will not produce higher SDO scores among women than among men, *everything else being equal*.

It should be noted that most of the aforementioned research, providing support for the prediction that men will be the primary agents of intergroup prejudice, appears to be primarily found with respect to aggressive and dominance-tinged forms of out-group prejudice. When dealing with more benign and less dominance-accented out-group discrimination, there is not only less consistent evidence of greater prejudice among men than women, but here women may be the more discriminating gender. In a review of the literature addressing gender differences in racial attitudes, Hughes and Tuch (2003) argue that in many domains, there are either no significant gender differences in racial attitudes or women express more biased attitudes than men. Interestingly, and largely in support of our predictions on the underlying motivations of women's prejudice, many of the domains in which women exhibit greater prejudice than men concern issues of intimacy, that is, women are less accepting of close social relationships with out-group men (Bogardus, 1928, 1959; Muir, 1990; Muir & McGlamery, 1984; Owen, Eisner, & McPaul, 1977). In their own research, Hughes and Tuch (2003) investigated two large nationally representative surveys in the United States for evidence of gender differences in racial attitudes. Although men were found to exhibit more racially intolerant attitudes than women on a number of items, these effects were generally quite small in magnitude, largely inconsistent, and often disappeared when the authors included a number of control variables (education, age, political ideology, religiosity, etc.). In more recent work, Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2008) investigated racial preferences in the context of a speed dating study and found that women exhibit stronger racial preferences than men, such that women are more likely to exhibit same-race dating preferences. Putting all of these findings together, the data seem to suggest that men's racial prejudice is greater than that of women with respect to more aggressive and dominance-oriented forms of arbitrary-set prejudice (e.g., endorsement of white superiority and black inferiority) but not with respect to various forms of in-group favoritism and social distance.

Although there seems to be abundant evidence in support of the predictions that men will be the primary agents of aggressive and dominance-oriented intergroup prejudice, there is at least some evidence that is not quite consistent with this expectation. For example, Haley, Sidanius, Lowery, and Malamuth (2004) found that white and black study participants recommended the most severe punishments for crimes when they were described as being committed by a male target belonging to a racial out-group rather than a female out-group target, or male and female in-group targets. Although this finding is

consistent with the “target-side” prediction of the SMTH, they also reported that there were no significant sex differences among research participants. That is, male and female study participants demonstrated equal amounts of bias against out-group men. Thus, even with some apparently hostile forms of intergroup bias (e.g., relatively severe criminal sanctions) where men are victimized more than women, it is not always the case that men will be the strongest advocates for aggressive outcomes. Clearly, more work needs to be done to uncover exactly when men will and will not act more aggressively toward out-group men than will women.

Motivations for Prejudice

Although we have asserted that women should be motivated to avoid out-group men in order to protect reproductive choice, it is important to note that such behavior does not come without costs. In practice, active avoidance of out-group men requires heightened cognitive attention to threatening cues and the exertion of energy as one attempts to avoid potential threats. This increase in cognitive effort and expended energy comes at the cost of failing to direct that effort toward other tasks also crucial to survival and reproduction. Taking such costs into consideration, it is likely that an avoidance mechanism selected to protect female choice would be calibrated to influence behavior during times when reproductive choice is at greatest risk, that is, during ovulation, or when copulation is most likely to result in conception. It may also be the case that an avoidance mechanism would be sensitive to variations among women in the extent to which they appraise themselves as being vulnerable to sexual coercion. In this way, avoidance and fear of out-group men is greatest among women who perceive themselves as being particularly vulnerable to such threats, and during times when the risk is greatest, thereby minimizing the energy expended in the service of protecting a woman's reproductive choice.

To test these predictions, Navarrete, Fessler, Santos Fleischman, and Geyer (2009) designed a study to investigate the influence of conception risk and perceived vulnerability to sexual coercion on the expression of race bias. In a university sample of white women, the researchers found that conception risk (a value reflecting a woman's proximity to the ovulatory period within her menstrual cycle) was positively associated with greater race bias. Importantly, race bias was measured in a variety of ways, including an explicit measure, two implicit measures (stereotype and evaluative implicit association tests; Amodio & Devine, 2006), a measure of fear of male targets, and a measure of mate preferences. When these measures were formed into a composite variable, the

relationship between conception risk and race bias was $r = .45$. In addition, the authors performed a regression analysis predicting race bias as a function of conception risk and an individual difference measure of perceived vulnerability to sexual coercion (e.g., “I avoid going out alone at night” and “I am wary of men”; Senn & Dzinan, 1996). The results revealed a two-way interaction such that the relationship between race bias and conception risk was greatest when perceived vulnerability to sexual coercion was high.

In an extension of these findings, Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, and Sidanius (2010) found that a woman's perceived vulnerability to sexual coercion is more strongly related to fear of out-group men than any other combination of race and gender (i.e., in-group men, out-group women, in-group women). The results of these studies support our contention that women's prejudice serves specific goals, namely, the protection of women's reproductive choice via increased fear toward and avoidance of out-group men when the threat to reproductive choice is greatest.

As was the case with women, it is also important to consider the potential costs incurred by men who use an approach-oriented strategy to dominate sexual rivals of the out-group. It should already be clear that among men, intergroup conflict is a high-risk/high-reward endeavor where the losers often lose their lives. As such, the propensity to engage in such a strategy likely requires more than the basic desire to dominate the men of the out-group; one must also appraise oneself as a formidable opponent. The greatest expressions of out-group bias then should be displayed by men who most strongly desire to dominate the out-group *and* who also perceive themselves as being best equipped to overcome the steep costs of conflict.

In an attempt to understand the male-specific psychology of prejudice, Navarrete et al. (2010) examined how individual differences in dominance motivations and aggressive formidability interact to predict race bias. The authors used a measure of SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) to assess one's desire to dominate out-groups. Aggressive formidability was assessed using a measure of aggressive behavior (Buss & Perry, 1992). Results revealed a three-way interaction, such that, among men, explicit race bias was related to aggression most strongly when SDO was high. In other words, race bias was greatest among men with a history of aggressive behavior and greater social dominance motives. In contrast, the interaction of SDO and aggression did not predict increased race bias among women.

Altogether, these results support the notion that race bias is moderated by separate psychological systems within men and women, being associated with the combination of aggressive formidability

and dominance motivations among men and vulnerability to sexual coercion among women, particularly when threats to reproductive choice are most costly. Furthermore, these results, in combination with those previously discussed, provide compelling evidence that both men and women exhibit out-group prejudice, that this prejudice is primarily directed toward out-group men, and that the targeted out-group need not necessarily be a subordinate or minority group. In addition, this research has generated evidence in support of the prediction that prejudice directed toward out-group men is predicted by different traits for men and women that reflect different underlying motivations, specifically fear of sexual coercion among women and aggressive social dominance ideation among men.

DISCUSSION

In our revisiting of SMTH proposed by SDT, we have attempted to fit it into a firmer conceptual grounding in evolutionary theory, namely the theories of parental investment and sexual selection; in doing so, we have clarified and extended the predictions asserted by the SMTH. First, we have reasoned that the differences in obligate parental investment between men and women have set up an incentive structure that favors competitive and risky behavior among men in the service of acquiring mating opportunities. The logic behind intrasexual competition among men was then extrapolated to intergroup relations where in-group men compete with out-group men for access to territory, status, mates, and other resources. Because women are considered a highly valued resource among men, they are not targeted as members of out-groups for harm or debilitation, but are instead often incorporated into the winning group. This logic confirms the initial prediction of the SMTH that men serve as the primary targets and agents of intergroup aggression. However, the SMTH additionally specified that it should be men of *subordinate* groups who are primarily targeted. We have attempted to revise this assertion using logic from parental investment theory and sexual selection and have also cited evidence in which subordinate groups have displayed intergroup biases toward dominant groups. Second, we have tried to clarify the types of intergroup prejudice that men and women are likely to be the agents for. We have suggested that there is little reason for gender differences with respect to intergroup prejudice manifested as in-group bias and in-group favoritism. Rather, it is within the domain of intergroup prejudice expressed as out-group denigration, social predation, and the violent establishment of dominant/subordinate intergroup architecture where one

should expect gender differences. Thus, men are expected to not only express a greater general willingness to establish and maintain systems of dominant/subordinate intergroup relations (e.g., as expressed by higher levels of classical racism and social dominance orientation), but also actively engage in very dangerous and violent forms of intergroup competition (e.g., hate crimes, gang wars, intertribal and interstate war). Finally, we have argued that the initial prediction made by the SMTH that men should act as the primary agents of intergroup aggression must be clarified to reflect a female-specific psychology of intergroup prejudice. Specifically, as a function of a long evolutionary history of being subjected to violent sexual aggression, women may have evolved psychological mechanisms that foster fear and avoidance of out-group men. As such, men's intergroup prejudice can be characterized as an approach-oriented strategy motivated by the desire for social dominance, whereas women's intergroup prejudice can be characterized as an avoidance strategy, motivated by the desire to protect one's reproductive choices. The net results of these clarifications and extensions have prompted us to summarize these expectations with the label, "Theory of Gendered Prejudice."

This new perspective emphasizes the importance of exploring racism, ethnocentrism, and arbitrary-set prejudice as a gendered phenomenon. That is, in studying the psychology of intergroup prejudice, the consideration of the gender of the target, the gender of its agents, and the character of the prejudice (i.e., as in-group favoritism or as out-group aggression) are key to understanding the fundamental nature of prejudice. We also hope that we have demonstrated the utility inherent in the integration of theories from the natural sciences with those from social psychology. Our use of parental investment and sexual selection theories provided a useful guide in understanding the functions served by prejudice and also in generating hypotheses regarding a gender-specific psychology of prejudice. We believe we have provided important clarifications and extensions of SDT that assist in framing intergroup prejudice as a functional endeavor in which men and women, through different mechanisms, cope with the gender-specific threats associated with intergroup conflict.

Although evolutionarily informed theories of social behavior are sometimes met with charges of biological determinism, we hope that it is clear from our arguments that we have not asserted invariant mechanisms that will inevitably lead to prejudiced behavior. Instead, we have attempted to illustrate the flexibility of these mechanisms as a function of the costs and benefits associated with the expression of prejudice. For example, the costs of intergroup aggression make it such that only those

men both with the goal of group domination and who appraise themselves as being aggressively equipped to meet the demands of the interaction are likely to pursue such a strategy. Among women, intergroup prejudice varies as a function of one's self-perceived vulnerability to sexual coercion and is also temporally influenced by hormonal fluctuations throughout the menstrual cycle. To be sure, intergroup prejudice is a relentlessly persistent phenomenon that has transcended time and geography, so to suggest that its underlying mechanisms are flexible certainly does not mean that they are easily manipulated to reduce the expression of racist and xenophobia attitudes, emotions, and behaviors. However, understanding these mechanisms is a necessary, albeit certainly not sufficient, first step in the right direction.

In our exploration of the underlying mechanisms of intergroup prejudice, we have certainly not been as comprehensive as is necessary for a complete account of the psychology of prejudice in all its forms, and there are surely a variety of other mechanisms at play. For example, relatively recent work on the behavioral immune system suggests that fear and avoidance of out-group members may serve the function of limiting contact with groups that have been exposed to parasites or diseases to which one's group has not developed an immunity (e.g., Schaller & Duncan, 2007). Additionally, although we have attempted to provide a foundation for understanding a female-specific psychology of prejudice, a comprehensive account is lacking, particularly in the domain of female coalitional aggression. Though perhaps more rare than male coalitional aggression, and possibly of a different form that is more akin to "clique" psychology (e.g., Grotzper & Crick, 1996; Hess & Hagen, 2006), research in this area could conceivably provide important insights regarding women's prejudice and is waiting to be developed in greater detail. It is also apparent from years of research that many factors play an important role in the propagation of prejudiced beliefs and behavior. It should be clear, then, that no single theory can carry the burden of explaining and understanding the nature of racism and ethnocentrism. An integrative theoretical framework supported by empirical evidence is crucial for research on the nature of intergroup relations to progress.

Finally, we would like to say a word about Marilyn Brewer's influence on the thinking in this chapter. While none of the authors of this chapter have had the privilege of being either graduate students or postdocs under Marilyn Brewer, one of us (Jim Sidanius) did have the invaluable opportunity of having Marilyn as a senior colleague at UCLA for five marvelous years. While no one can accuse Marilyn of being a social dominance theorist, my frequent theoretical encounters

and disputes with her over this all too short 5-year period had a profound influence on me as a maturing academic and on the subsequent development of SDT. Most memorably, it was Marilyn's gentle, but insightful querying and probing of my early thinking within SDT that led to the development of the notion of the counterbalancing effects of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating social forces, an idea which has come to play a central role in SDT. I was heartbroken when Marilyn decided to leave UCLA to take up a position at Ohio State University in 1993. Although we still maintained contact after her departure, nothing could replace the almost daily exposure to her wise counsel and sharp intelligence. Marilyn Brewer has influenced me in more ways than almost any other living scholar I can think of. I cannot thank her enough for simply being who she is.

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MARILYNN B. BREWER

**Roderick M. Kramer
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ψ Psychology Press
Taylor & Francis Group

New York London

Psychology Press
Taylor & Francis Group
711 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017

Psychology Press
Taylor & Francis Group
27 Church Road
Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA

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Psychology Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

International Standard Book Number: 978-1-84872-935-3 (Hardback)

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